particular, the single-gene Mendelian model. Heron's paper purported to show that the material on which the ERO's papers were based 'has been collected with a decided bias in favour of a particular theory of heredity; that it is presented with extraordinary carelessness; that it is, on internal evidence, repeatedly contradictory; that it is not treated in any adequate statistical manner, and that the conclusions reached are not justified by the data'.' Part II, by Pearson and Gustav A. Jaederholm, and Part III, by Pearson alone, were more moderate in tone, presenting the biometricians' positive view of how the genetics of feeblemindedness should be approached.
It is important to realize that Heron and Pearson were not opposed to eugenics. Indeed, Donald MacKenzie has argued that there was a methodological link (as well as a financial one) between biometry and eugenics.10 Their critique was motivated by the fear that the slipshod methods (and, to a lesser extent, data) of the ERO would cripple the progress of eugenics. Heron spoke for them all when he wrote, 'those of us who have the highest hopes for the new science of Eugenics in the future are not a little alarmed by many of the recent contributions to the subject which threaten to place Eugenics with the older " social science" and much of modern sociology -entirely outside the pale of true science'."
Certainly by today's standards, the Mendelian theory of mental defect is easily refuted. But it could equally well have been rejected by geneticists of the time. David Barker put it bluntly: 'Since the standards [of criticism] are those which could and should have been used by an undergraduate geneticist in 1914, it is difficult to see why it was not immediately pronounced unseaworthy on " internalist" or scientific grounds ' . 12 Barker then went on to suggest reasons why the Mendelian theory remained so influential for so long. But he seems not to have been aware that the theory had, in fact, been subjected to rigorous critique. The important question is why this critique counted for so little in the long term. After examining the three papers in the 'Mendelism and the Problem of Mental Defect' series, we propose an answer.
Heron began his paper by attacking Davenport's advice. Even if the Mendelian model were true, he noted, the effect of 'weakness' marrying 'strength' is but a temporary masking for one generation of the defective alleles and the production of heterozygous carriers (when 'strength' is homozygous), or the production of 50 per cent 'weakness' 10 MacKenzie, op cit. (1), 271. Eileen Magnello has disputed this link, however, arguing that the work carried out in the Drapers' Biometric Laboratory was very different both in subject and in methodology from that performed in the Galton Eugenics Laboratory (M. E. Magnello, 'Karl Pearson's methodological innovations: the Drapers' Biometric Laboratory and the Galton Eugenics Laboratory', History of Science, in press). One area of overlap, however, was work on heredity and Mendelian genetics, and it is noteworthy that, although Heron was appointed to the Galton Laboratory, he was also trained in Pearsonian biometrics and published several papers in Biometrika, the primary journal of Drapers' Laboratory. Moreover, Heron was seen by Davenport (when 'strength' is heterozygous). Sooner or later two feebleminded alleles will be united, and the 'weakness' expressed. Davenport clearly did not understand that the heterozygous carriers were a fresh source of the defect every generation and that his advice would greatly increase their number.
Heron then proceeded to examine in detail a number of ERO Bulletins, and, briefly, The Kallikak Family. (Feeblemindedness had not yet been published.) He discovered a plethora of problems. First, much of the data had obviously been collected with the Mendelian hypothesis in mind. Thus field workers were instructed to make a special effort to find feeblemindedness in the ancestry of two normal-minded -but by hypothesis heterozygous -parents of a feebleminded child, thus proving the heterozygosity. When these ancestors could not be traced, heterozygosity was simply assumed. If neither the parents nor children were feebleminded, no search was made in their ancestry, and they were all considered homozygous for the normal-minded allele. As Berkeley zoologist Samuel J. Holmes also noted, the classification of normal-minded individuals as either homozygous normal or heterozygous was made 'according to whatever assumption is necessary to bring facts into accord with theory '13 Secondly Either there is a mistake in calling them normal, or a mistake in calling the parents feeble-minded; or else there was illegitimacy somewhere and these two children did not have the same father as others in the family. Or we may turn to the Mendelian law and we discover that according to that law there might be in rare instances such a combination of circumstances that a normal child might be born from two parents that function as feeble-minded.14 Heron remarked, 'Thus the facts are to be considered as elastic, and if that fails we are to make the theory plastic enough to cover the facts'. 15 At least one of the points raised by Heron was genetically sophisticated: he noted the the appropriate, biometrical, way. The second paper in the series20 confines most of its criticism to Davenport's classification of feeblemindedness. Both in this paper and in Part III, Pearson argued that the feebleminded and the normals were both part of a single continuous distribution of intelligence, rather than distinct classes separated by some intellectual boundary. Moreover, he claimed that since mental defectives were not differentiable from normals by mentality, but rather were 'socially inefficient', distinguishing the two was not simply a medical problem solvable with simple tests. Pearson21 was one of the first to argue that feeblemindedness might not be completely due to heredity -a remarkable observation for a geneticist of that time -and he noted that correlations between degraded environments and feeblemindedness told us nothing about causality.
Like Why was Heron's critique so ineffective? We suggest several reasons. The first concerns its style. The paper was extremely hostile in tone, repetitive (for example the Davenport quotation, 'strength may marry weakness', occurs at least once on every page of pp. 5-8, and is paraphrased on these and other pages as well), intemperate ('We cannot conceive of a greater evil than that expressed in the teaching above [that "strength may marry weakness," etc.]') and highly personal ('we are not prepared to dissent from the view that the citation of a pedigree by Dr Davenport is a disqualification for its future use '). 36 In addition, in many places, Heron was criticizing minute inconsistencies in the data, in long paragraphs of dense prose. It may be that few readers could stomach sixty-two pages of this. In support of this explanation, we have discovered very few citations of Heron's paper within or outside the genetics community. Given the fact that it was published in a widely known series and publicized in the leading American newspaper,37 we do not think that the paper was simply overlooked. 38 Secondly, Heron 
